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Transsexualism as Metaphor: The Collision
of Sex and Gender
LESLIE PEARLMANt
[W]e [transsexuals] and the professionals should stress that there are many
sexes and genders, and try to change the legal and popular view of sex from
a dichotomy to a continuum... to have sex reassignment as acceptable as
moving from New York to Los Angeles.'
I've been treated so bad as a drag queen. If I get a pussy, I'll be treated
fabulous.2
INTRODUCTION
Imagine awaking one morning to find that you were in the
body of the opposite sex. Nothing about your identity has changed,
you are still you, except your body is different. There are breasts
where there were none before, or perhaps now you have a penis.
The question, "would that still be me"3 would be answered in the
affirmative. A different body doesn't change one's subjective sense
of being a man or a woman.
Now imagine what you would do in response to this body
change. Perhaps you would feel compelled to explain that despite
your physical appearance, that's not the "real" you. Most likely,
t J.D., May 1995, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. Special
thanks to Professor Isabel Marcus who introduced me to the transgendered world, and Pro-
fessor Lucinda Finley who provided the tools to explore it.
1. DEBORAH HELLER FEINBLOOM, TRANsvEsTITEs & TRANSSEXUALS: MIXED VIEws 159-60
(1976) (quoting Marion, a feminist post-operative transsexual).
2. Pepper, Mother of the House of Labeja in Jennie Livingston's film PARIS Is BURNING
(Academy Entertainment Inc. 1992). This documentary is a glimpse into the world of drag
balls in the gay community of Harlem. The balls are run by different "houses" such as the
House of Extravaganza. Each house is comprised of a "mother," who is a legend at walking
a ball, and its children. Each ball has numerous categories, such as: (1) pretty girl; (2) high
fashion; (3) miss cheesecake - luscious body; (4) big boy; (5) school boy/school girl; (6) town
and country; (7) executive realness; (8) butch queen first time in drag at a ball; and (9)
realness. The balls offer an escape from the realities of a straight white world. As Willi Ninji
explained, "we as a people are the greatest example of behavior modification; we have
learned to survive." Id.
3. Anthony Appiah poses this question while examining the subjective factors in iden-
tity formation. Anthony Appiah, "But Would That Still Be Me?" Notes on Gender, "Race,"
Ethnicity, and Sources of "Identity," 87 J. PHm. 493 (1990).
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you would encounter societal resistance to accepting your sense of
being over your appearance. This frustration might lead you to
seek medical or psychological assistance, and if in doing so, you
were told that through hormone therapy and surgery you could
realign your body to match your subjective self, would you?
This is one of the dilemmas facing transsexuals. Transsexuals
represent a threat to the accepted, though widely disputed, social
"norm" that an individual's sex is fixed and immutable.4 This
"norm" is reinforced by the social construction of gender 5 which
recognizes only two true sexes.' Transsexuals, however, challenge
4. The threat is best illustrated by the following example: John Doe "becomes" Jane
Doe through the reality of sex reassignment surgery. This possibility challenges the notion
that "boys are boys" and "girls are girls." Indeed, even the force of this customary saying
illustrates the socially constructed belief that sex is immutable.
Immutable characteristics are those unalterable characteristics which are an "accident"
of birth. These include race, national origin and sex. The immutable distinction has been
used to argue that sexual orientation is also an immutable characteristic in that being gay
isn't a "choice," but rather an accident of birth.
Another interesting question is should courts protect groups that are not discrete and
insular? In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Court in foot-
note 4 questioned whether "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a spe-
cial condition." Id. at 153. The Court then defined these minorities as particular religious,
national or racial minorities. Id. at 152-53. Can we read into the footnote other groups that
are stigmatized as grievously as the Carolene group? Arguably, transsexuals are a "discrete"
minority since they are marked in ways that make it easy for others to identify them. But
see Holloway v. Anderson and Company, 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977) (court is unable
to find transsexuals a "discrete and insular minority").
One could argue that transsexuals are closer to "anonymous" minorities in that it is
possible to keep identification hidden. However, since the process of becoming a transsexual
is not an anonymous action, but requires recognition and accommodation, anonymity is im-
possible. These insular minorities are persons subject to the power of the political commu-
nity yet excluded from participation within it. Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts and the
Fate of the "Insider-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (1986). As Brilmayer explains,
many discrete and insular minorities are in reality "insiders-outsiders" in that they are si-
multaneously subject to state power while located outside the community so that "discrimi-
natory treatment is suspect." Id. at 1293. He terms these persons "second class citizens." Id.
5. The social construction of gender is a primary concern for feminist theorists. Femi-
nist theory, which analyzes male power and dominance, asserts that differences between
men and women are a result of "systems of gender that construct and differentiate activities
and identities in accord with, although they are not determined by, biological sex." JANICE
M. IRVINE, DISORDERS OF DESIRE: SEX AND GENDER IN MODERN AMERICAN SEXOLOGY 150
(1990). It has been argued that the absence of gender is in essence the male standard, while
the female standard is always seen as gendered. The challenge is to deconstruct this male
standard, which Catherine A. MacKinnon sees as "metaphysically nearly perfect." See
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CuLmnn & Soc'Y 635, 638 (1983).
6. The difference between sex and gender can be understood in the following way:
[S]ex [is] used in its realist, essentialist sense to mean a fundamental, natural,
biological determination of "maleness" or "femaleness"... gender, in contrast, [is]
used in its constructivist, historical sense to mean a culturally determined, socially
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the longstanding concept that sex is immutable through the reality
of sex reassignment surgery.7
The obsession of the legal community in categorizing pre- and
post-operative transsexuals" has focused upon uncovering the ac-
tual sex of pre- and post-operative transsexuals.9 Although the
courts couch their decisions solely in terms of biological recogni-
tion (is the transsexual in question male or female?), they have,
constructed, and historically variant description of those acts that compose how
an individual does "being male" or "being female."
Druann Pagliassotti, On the Discursive Construction of Sex and Gender, 20 COMM. REs.
472, 474-75 (1993).
7. Calling sex reassignment surgery a "sex-change operation" is a misnomer. A sex-
change implies that the transsexual is the "wrong" gender, when in theory, the transsexual
is the "wrong" sex. For the transsexual, gender doesn't follow from sex, rather the reverse is
true: sex follows from gender. Cultural anxiety insists that if John has a gender identity that
is feminine and thus female, then it is necessary to align John's genital sex to match his
gender and therefore become Joanne. This cultural anxiety which insists boys be boys and
girls be girls should not be so quickly dismissed. It might play a significant role in why
transsexuals choose to undergo genital surgery. Indeed Kate Bornstein, a transsexual les-
bian, explains the force of cultural anxiety this way: "we're living a world that insists we be
one or the other - a world that doesn't bother to tell us what one or the other is." KATE
BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF Us 8 (1994).
8. Pre-operative transsexuals, for example are biological females who identify as male,
but who have not undergone sex reassignment surgery to conform their genital sex with
their gender identity. Post-operative transsexuals are those individuals who have undergone
sex reassignment surgery.
9. Categorizing pre- and post-operative transsexuals as either male or female is an ob-
session because it is not only the first (and often only) decision reached by courts, it is
outcome determinative. For example, protection against employment discrimination has
often been reduced to whether the transsexual employee can use the men's restroom or the
women's restroom. Such biological obsession distorts and distracts the court from address-
ing the real issue: what level of accommodation is required in the workplace? See, e.g., Doe
v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993).
Kate Bornstein recounts that when she went through her gender change, this question
caused her employer's building manager serious anxiety. His solution was to allow Bornstein
to use a bathroom four floors below which was under construction.
Piles of plaster and wiring littered the floor, and pools of water lay everywhere.
But there was a working bathroom in the very back of the floor, and that's where
they sent me. No one cleaned it, no one kept it stocked. It was poorly lit and it
was scary. Isn't it amazing the lengths we'll go to in order to maintain the illusion
that there are only two genders, and that these genders must remain separate?
BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 84-85.
The courts have been asked to determine whether post-operative transsexuals are enti-
tled to an amended birth certificate to reflect their "new" sex. See Hartin v. Director of
Bureau of Records, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1973). See infra notes 74-82 and accompany-
ing text. The courts have also been asked to determine whether a true transsexual is entitled
to medical coverage for sex reassignment surgery (see, e.g., Denise R. v. Lavine, 364
N.Y.S.2d 557 (App. Div. 1975), rev'd, 383 N.Y.S. 2d 568 (1976)), as well as the appropriate
treatment of transsexual prisoners. See, e.g., Farmer v. Haas, 990 F. 2d 319 (7th Cir. 1993);
Gomez v. Maass, 918 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1990); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1988).
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nevertheless, unintelligibly attempted to define appropriate gender
roles. Indeed, the law has used sex and gender interchangeably, 10
despite the fact that the construction of sex (male/female) and the
construction of gender (masculine/feminine) are two distinct
tasks.11
It is the semantic distinction between sex and gender and the
subsequent jurisprudential construction of gender which the legal
community has failed to understand, but that cannot be ignored.
12
10. Whether this has been a conscious substitution by the courts or an oversight is an
important question. Despite the much argued distinction between sex and gender, some
feminist legal theorists, such as Catherine A. MacKinnon, consciously use sex and gender
interchangeably. Catherine MacKinnon reasons that since "sexuality is fundamental to gen-
der and fundamentally social, and that [since] biology is its social meaning in the system of
sex inequality, which is a social and political system that does not rest independently on
biological differences in any respect, the sex/gender distinction looks [more] like a nature/
culture distinction." MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 635 n.1.
11. The social construction of gender is a powerful tool because it poses as universal or
natural truths which reify gender difference. An example of this "natural truth" is reflected
in the assumption that women make better parents because they are "naturally" more nur-
turing. The fact that one's natural biological construction is the cause of inequality, Zillah
Eisenstein claims, is not because of the "truth" of biological differences, but because of how
these differences are socially constructed. ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE
LAW 108-16 (1988). See also THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER (Judith Lorber & Susan
A. Farrell eds., 1991).
12. In rethinking concepts of sex and gender, traditional jurisprudence has failed to
examine the context within which sex and gender are constructed and the impact of this
construction. Dennis Patterson'argues that "change must come from the redesign of our
tools." Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/FeminismLaw, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 310
(1992). He explains that the "actual tools of the law are its concepts and linguistic prac-
tices." Id. Indeed, echoing the postmodern feminist call, "meaning is a function of a system
of interconnected language-games that together constitute a 'horizon of understanding.'"
Id. at 311.
Professor Lucinda M. Finley highlights the feminist jurisprudential task of challenging
not only legal reasoning, but the legal language itself by claiming "Language matters. Law
matters. Legal language matters." Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law:
The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886,
886 (1989). Not only is law a male gendered language, but the very use of the term "gender"
is also shaped by the male norm. Accordingly, by calling attention to the term sex and the
term gender the reader is challenged to ask: when is it gender? when is it sex? which gen-
der? which sex? does it matter?
Some would argue that these questions are superfluous and of no practical importance.
For example, Christine Littleton states:
But if it does turn out that, given a flat cost curve, most biological women opt for
social womanhood and most biological men opt for social manhood and very few
explore new modes of social existence, I'm not sure I'd care very much. The mod-
ernists may enjoy mixing things up for its own sake, me I'm in it for the equality.
Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL L. REV. 1279, 1334-35
(1987). Although the test for theory in action might differ from the "theoretical" ideal, I say
that without a self-conscious ability of the culture to question gender as its own creation,
translating theory into action is without substance or significance.
COLLISION OF SEX AND GENDER
The separate concepts of gender and sex must be respected and
accorded their true, individual meanings. If they are not, the uni-
queness of the transsexual situation cannot be understood. Indeed,
legal categories constructed along lines of traditional notions of sex
and gender lead to several inaccurate conclusions. The first is that
sex, an accident of birth, is a given characteristic unworthy of
questioning. The second is that sex is an unalterable, immutable
characteristic. I3 The third, is that gender, also unalterable, is con-
strained to match biological sex. Thus, gender is assigned through
genitalia and reproductive capacity.'4 Due to this biological assign-
ment, the law inaccurately assumes that sex and gender fit to-
gether; that gender follows from sex.
For the pre- and post-operative transsexual, the medical and
legal determination of sex and gender are the same. For example, a
male-to-female pre-operative transsexual is viewed medically and
legally as male and it is not until the completion of sex reassign-
ment surgery that the medical and legal community will view the
post-operative transsexual as female. 15 Medical and legal recogni-
tion does not happen simultaneously. Rather, the legal determina-
tion is based on the medical determination. The relationship, how-
ever, is co-dependent and circular, and results in a legal
reinforcement of the biological basis. 6 But for the transsexual in
transition, 7 medical and legal determinations do not correlate. For
example, a male to female transsexual, who is in the process of
transformation, but who has not undergone sex reassignment sur-
gery, will "announce" her femaleness despite the continued pres-
ence of a penis (biological maleness). Thus, social construction
would say this person's sex and gender are at odds with one an-
other. Even though the transsexual views herself as female, the le-
gal community does not.' Mistakenly, the legal community refuses
to accept the proposition that one's gender is as much an indica-
tion of sex as is biology. Rather, until an individual's genitals con-
form with their gender identity, courts will not recognize a
transsexual's "true sex."' 9 The ramifications for a transsexual who
13. ANNIE WOODHOUSE, FANTASTIC WOMEN: SEX, GENDER AND TRANSVESTISM, xiii (1989).
14. Id.
15. See infra part IE.
16. This relationship is similar to the process of gender construction. The "universal
truth" of biological maleness and femaleness is indeed the cultural reinforcement of the
biological basis of gender.
17. The transsexual in transition refers to the time period where an individual decides
to undergo sex reassignment surgery, begins taking hormones, dresses and "lives" in the
desired gender role, but has not yet undergone actual genital realignment through surgery.
18. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
19. True sex is used to mean an inclusive definition of sex identity which takes into
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does not meet this criteria may be serious.
While it may appear that the transsexual in transition consti-
tutes only an insignificant minority, the implications for feminist
jurisprudence must be considered. The transsexual in transition
brings to light the law's insistence that gender be defined by bio-
logical and genital sex. This practice is a form of institutionalized
oppression which affects non-transsexuals as well. It is manifested
in a culture which views "feminine" men as "fags" and "mascu-
line" women as "dykes." As such, genital castration of femininized
men and masculinized women is the only solution in our heter-
ocentric society. The difference between figurative castration (in-
ternalized suppression of gender identity) and actual surgery is ir-
relevant. The power of metaphysical castration poses a conundrum
that requires a re-examination of the rights of transsexuals in tran-
sition while offering an interesting metaphor for feminist dis-
course-the third sex.2
This Note challenges the reader to confront the underlying as-
sumptions regarding the nature and language of legal discourse
and the construction of sex and gender, and uses the transsexual as
a case in point. Part I is an attempt to deconstruct the social and
cultural institutions at work in the lives of transsexuals. This Part
will attempt to create a working definition of transsexualism. In
addition, it will show that a continuum of sex and gender, rather
than an exclusive approach, is needed to challenge the assumption
that gender is determined solely by biological sex. The section con-
account both a biological determination and a psychological subjective one.
20. I use the term "third sex" to highlight the continuum between the polar extremes of
"male" and "female." I do not wish to argue that there are a specific "number" of sexes,
only that the bipolar distinction of only two sexes is inadequate. The "third sex" is another
way of categorizing the mutability of sex and thus a transsexual's "true sex."
The post-modem challenge to this essentialism deconstructs the "truth" of sex and gen-
der: there is no one such thing as "male" and "female," rather it has many meanings. The
post-modem feminist perspective is associated with an "attitude that accepts fluidity, un-
certainty and difference as an acceptable scholarly position." Gary Minda, Title VII at the
Crossroads of Employment Discrimination Law and Postmodern Feminist Theory: United
Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. and its Implications for the Women's Rights Move-
ment, 11 ST. Lotus U. PUB. L. REV. 89, 93 n.16 (1992).
Even feminist jurisprudence is not immune from falling prey to suggesting "essential
womaness," although many have exposed feminism's own tendency. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V.
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF ExCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); An-
gela P. Harris, Race & Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990);
Madelyn C. Squire, Discovering Our Connections: Reflections on Race, Gender and the
Other Tales of Difference, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 795 (1993). Kate Bornstein claims
that the time is ripe for "transgendered people to come together under [their] own banner: a
banner that would include anyone who cares to admit their own gender ambiguities, a ban-
ner that includes all sexualities, races and ethnicities, religions, ages, classes, and states of
body, a banner of the Third." BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 98.
[Vol. 43
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cludes with a discussion of how classification anxiety shapes the
law relating to sex identity, gender construction and transsexuals.
Part II focuses on the legal determination of sex and discusses the
legal community's involvement in reinforcing gender as culturally
determined. This Part illustrates how the medical community con-
structs the transsexual's "true" sex, while the legal community re-
stricts the ways the transsexual can live as reassigned to that sex.
Through deconstructing legal categories constructed along lines of
traditional notions of sex and gender and by using Title VII as an
example, Part III concludes that the legal categorization of "sex"
cannot be limited to its functional or biological meaning. An ex-
pansive meaning of "sex," rather than a functional meaning, per-
mits extending Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination to
transsexuals.
I. DECONSTRUCTION
A. Attempting to Define Transsexualism
A transsexual is one who in some deeper sense believes that
they are another gender.21 Gender "denotes a person's psychosex-
21. Transsexualism has been defined as a "passionate, life-long conviction that one's
psychological gender-that indefinable feeling of maleness or femaleness-is opposite to one's
anatomical sex." Jerold Taitz, The Law Relating to the Consummation of Marriage Where
One of the Spouses is a Post-Operative Transsexual, 15 ANGLO-Am. L. REV. 141, 143 (1986).
A more political alternative would be "[a]nyone whose performance of gender calls into
question the construct of gender itself." BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 121. It is estimated
that one person in 37,000 is a transsexual, and male-to-female transsexuals are 4 times more
common. Sir Martin Roth, Address at the Royal Society of Medicine (May 8, 1980), in 49
MEDICO-LEGAL J. 5, 12 (1981). See also Ronald R. Garret, Self-Transformability, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 121 (1991).
Transsexualism has also been referred to as gender dysphoria. RICHARD F. DOCTOR,
TRANSVESTITES AND TRANSSEXUALS: TOwARD A THEORY OF CROSS-GENDER BEHAVIOR 24
(1988). Under this theory, transsexuals are either primary or secondary. Id. Primary
transsexualism encompasses those persons who have "a history of cross-gender identity, and
an absence of fetishism associated with cross-dressing.... The critical component that sets
this category apart from all others is the necessary history of lifelong gender dysphoric feel-
ings." Id. at 24-25. Docter explains the difference between the fetishistic transvestite who
cross dresses to impersonate a woman, and the fetishist whose act of cross dressing is a form
of sexual excitement. Unlike the fetishist transvestite, the fetishist's cross dressing does not
involve feelings of a cross gendered identity. Id. at 10. Conversely, secondary transsexuals
take two forms: transvestism and homosexuality. Id. at 29.
In response to being classified as gender dysphoric, Kate Bornstein writes:
I'm called "gender dysphoric." That means I have a sickness: a limited under-
standing of gender. I don't think it's that. I like to look at it that I was gender
dysphoric for my whole life before, and for some time after my gender change -
blindly buying into the gender system. As soon as I came to some understanding
of the constructed nature of gender, and my relationship to that system, I ceased
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ual individuality, or the subjective awareness of maleness or
femaleness. Sex, on the other hand, means either anatomical or bi-
ological sex."'22 Through surgery, the transsexual seeks a physical
representation that conforms with their gender identity.2 By doing
so, the transsexual challenges the societal assumption that a bio-
logical male grows to be masculine and a biological female grows to
be feminine.24
Surgery is seen as the physical completion of a social and bio-
logical process of sex reassignment.2 5 Eligibility for sex reassign-
ment surgery requires the transsexual to take a "real life test" in
which the transsexual assumes their desired gender role26 for at
least twelve months prior to surgery. During the "real life test,"
transsexuals are required to change their sex by looking, living and
working in their desired gender role.2s The requirement that a
transsexual must undergo this process to realign sex to conform
with gender, reinforces the binary construction of sex and gender.
B. Binary Construction of Sex and Gender
Binary thinking is characterized by an assumption of two
sexes (male and female) and two genders (masculine and femi-
being gender dysphoric.
BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 118-19.
22. Jerold Taitz, Judicial Determination of the Sexual Identity of Post-Operative
Transsexuals: A New Form of Sex Discrimination, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 53, 54 (1987). Kate
Bornstein reminds us "to keep gender and sex separated as, respectively, system and func-
tion." BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 31. As such, sex is the act and gender is the classification.
23. Sex reassignment surgery had its beginnings in 1931. David M. Neff, Denial of Title
VII Protection to Transsexuals: Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 34 DEPAUL L. REv. 553, 560
(1985). The term "transsexual" was first coined in 1949. Id. The American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation formally categorized transsexualism in the DSM-III as a mental disorder in the
1980's and the diagnostic criteria for transsexualism, set forth in DSM-III-R, are as follows:
(1) profound unhappiness with one's anatomical sex; (2) a preoccupation for changing both
primary and secondary characteristics for at least two years; (3) must not be a result of
"situational" stress. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 263 (3d ed. 1980).
24. FEINBLOOM, supra note 1, at 150-51. This assumption reinforces the belief in biolog-
ical gender, which, as Kate Bornstein explains, is really "a belief in the supremacy of the
body in the determination of identity. It's biological gender that most folks refer to when
they say sex. By calling something 'sex,' we grant it seniority over all the other types of
gender - by some right of biology." BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 30.
25. FEINBLOOM, supra note 1, at 26.
26. See Richard Green, Spelling "Relief" for Transsexuals: Employment Discrimina-
tion and the Criteria of Sex, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 125 (1985).
27. Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1993).
28. WOODHOUSE, supra note 13, at 3. The test, which ultimately requires the individual
to be employed in their desired gender role, is fraught with various forms of employment
discrimination. See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
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nine).2 9 Unlike a continuum of sex and gender which recognizes
varying degrees of maleness/femaleness and masculinity/feminin-
ity, the binary is an either/or construction. Transsexuals in transi-
tion challenge this polarity by incorporating multiple aspects of
maleness/femaleness and femininity/masculinity as they move to-
ward identity cohesion. Deconstructing rigid gender categories of
female and male is central to resolving the conflict between medi-
cal definitions of sex/gender and legal definitions of sex/gender.
The law, which is essentially an artefact, is a system of regulations which
depends upon precise definitions;. . . the law is obliged to classify its mate-
rial into exclusive categories; it is therefore, a binary system designed to
produce conclusions of the yes or no type. Biological phenomena however,
cannot be reduced to exclusive categories so that medicine often cannot give
Yes or No answers . . . [pleople are not either tall or short, they are taller
or shorter or about average. This fundamental conflict lies at the root of all
relations between medicine and law."
If "biological phenomena" are not readily classifiable, then a bi-
nary construction of gender fails to recognize gender identity as a
relative construction. Instead of thinking in terms of either mascu-
line or feminine, one should think in varying levels of masculinity
and femininity. Removing the exclusivity of gender categories (ei-
ther/or) gives birth to a gender continuum which not only allows
for a complete rethinking of what is "natural" for males and fe-
males, but sets the stage for the construction of a metaphysical
"third sex" and "third gender" since the transsexual arguably be-
longs to neither constructed category.
Western culture, through its legal and medical establishments,
fails to recognize the continuum of genders and sexes, but rather
embraces the idea that there are only two sexes and genders. For
example, the medical community has contributed to creating the
dual sexual system (male/female) by eliminating "ambiguous"
sexes when parents are required to choose the most appropriate
sex of an intersexed 1 infant at birth. Tied to this sexual system is
29. Kate Bornstein proposes eight rules of gender: (1) there are two and only two gen-
ders; (2) one's gender is invariant; (3) genitals are the essential sign of gender; (4) any excep-
tions to two genders are not to be taken seriously; (5) there are no transfers from one gender
to another; (6) everyone must be classified as a member of one gender or another; (7) the
male/female dichotomy is a natural one; and (8) membership in one gender or another is
natural. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 45-51.
30. Taitz, supra note 21, at 57 (citing Roger Ormrod, The Medico-Legal Aspects of Sex
Determination, 40 MEDIcO-LEGAL J. 78 (1972)).
31. Intersexed refers to persons who posses both male and female biological characteris-
tics. It is estimated that intersexed infants may compromise about 4% of births. Anne
Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are Not Enough, THE SCIENCES,
1995]
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a corollary two-party gender system (feminine/masculine) that
only recognizes male as masculine and female as feminine.3 2
. The maintenance of a "two-party sexual system" (male/fe-
male), however, defies nature, especially since the scientific com-
munity recognizes a significant number of biological and chromo-
somal varieties." In addition, recognizing the reality of a gender
continuum faces the difficult task of overcoming society's anxieties
and reluctance to change.
C. Classification Anxiety
Classification anxiety3 4 shapes the law relating to sex identity
and gender construction.3 5 Classification is a powerful tool for
heterosexist culture. The association of persons within definitive
categories (i.e., male/female, straight/gay, rich/poor) carries a co-
rollary societal valuation effect. For example, a man displaying
"feminine characteristics" will be classified as a "homosexual" and
Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 20, 21.
32. The force of the two-party gender system mimics the laws' rationalizing effect be-
cause the gender system acts as the process of natural construction. In essence, it operates
as the divine (gendered) law of nature.
33. Fausto-Sterling, supra note 31, at 21. Fausto-Sterling proposes that there are five
sexes and explains the concept of an "intersexed body." Id. Intersexed individuals take
three major forms: true hermaphrodites who have one testes and one ovary; "male"
pseudohermaphrodites who have testes and some aspects of female genitalia but no ovaries;
and "female" pseudohermaphrodites who have ovaries and some aspects of male genitalia
but no testes. Id.
34. Classification anxiety is the societal need to identify with definitive categories. It is
reinforced by "the need for a recognizable identity, and the need to belong to a group of
people with a similar identity - these are driving forces in our culture, and nowhere is this
more evident than in the areas of gender and sexuality." BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 3-4.
35. The discourse on gender construction addresses the concept of fear of fraud. The
fear is a reaction to misleading gender construction. If someone dresses "as a woman," talks
"like a woman" and acts "like a woman," we expect her to "be a woman." Cultural anxiety
is not about fraudulent sex determination, but fraudulent sex representation. In a culture
obsessed with representation (how we look to others and how we are perceived), the trans-
gression of gender, rather than the transgression of sex, is the most anxiety producing.
Gender confusion echoes the obstruction of class confusion as well. Just like cultural
gender signifiers, cultural class signifiers are essential to distinguish between classes and
keep social order. Historically, the regulation of clothing acted as a form of control by keep-
ing persons in their proper place. Pagliassotti, supra note 6, at 484. This control dates back
to the medieval and early modern sumptuary laws. These laws sought to regulate and re-
strict wearing certain fabrics, furs and styles to specific classes of citizens. The attempt was
for clear readability of one's social status without confusion. See MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED
INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING & CULTURAL ANxmY 21-32 (1992). Indeed, in early American
history, clothing according to rank made visible the underlying Puritan social philosophy of
divine nature. "One end of apparel is to distinguish and put a difference between persons
according to the Places and Conditions [sic]." PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND:
FROM COLONY TO PROVINCE 48 (1953).
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not a true man. Since homosexuals are devalued in our culture, the
classification removes the feminine man from the mainstream and
places him into a category of "other."3 6
This classification anxiety is raised to a higher level when
combined with ambiguity in sex and gender construction. Imagine
a person whose genitalia enables them to have heterosexual sex
with both men and women (since they possess both male and fe-
male biological characteristics). This image challenges notions of
accepted sexuality. Since sexuality (the act) is a factor in distin-
guishing between "men" and "women" in heterosexual culture (the
identity),3 7 transsexuals, like hermaphrodites, "possess the irritat-
ing ability to live sometimes as one sex and sometimes the other,
and they raise the specter of homosexuality."3
Transsexualism, on another level, is threatening because it
gives a human dimension to the unrecognized ground between the
rules of a binary structure. The transsexual "reconfigures the rela-
tionships between the original pair, [male=masculine; fe-
male=feminine] and puts in question identities previously con-
ceived as stable, unchallengeable, grounded and 'known.' ' 's
Crossing gender boundaries is a challenge not only to assigning
categories,4" but to the corresponding desire to regulate and limit
"confusion." Incongruence between sex and gender "shakes the
very basis of the way the world works." '41 Indeed,
[i]f people can't put a label on you they get confused... people have to
know who you are. You walk down the street and the first thing you do
when you see a person is to say to yourself, "That's a male. That's a female.
That's an older person." You categorize in your mind. One of the first
things you do is determine the sex-if you can't do that it blows the whole
system up."2
Thus we are left asking questions such as what is gender?
36. The concept of "otherness" can be understood as "any group or individual that has
been marginalized by the dominant group(s) at the 'center' of society, the locus of greatest
control." Squire, supra note 20, at 813 (quoting CHARLENE SPRETNAK, STATES OF GRACE 157
(1991)).
37. "Is it a boy or a girl?" is often the first question one says to a new parent. Imagine
the anxiety that would result from trying to explain that your baby was neither.
38. Fausto-Sterling, supra note 31, at 24. "The existence of transgendered people-peo-
ple who exist sexually for pleasure, and not procreation-strikes terror at the heart of our
puritanical Eurocentric Culture." BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 78.
39. GARBER, supra note 35, at 13.
40. Marjorie Garber terms this "category crisis," which she defines as "a failure of defi-
nitional distinction, a borderline that becomes permeable." She claims that this crisis is
central to culture. Id. at 16.
41. WOODHOUSE, supra note 13, at 4.
42. Id. at 4-5.
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What is male? What is female? The classification of gender is a
form of minimizing cultural anxiety. Culturally marked categories
(of male and female) are made up of antiquated gender identities.
Despite the transgressors' challenge to classification based on these
antiquated notions, many transsexuals themselves embrace sexual
stereotypes of femininity and masculinity.
D. Feminism and Transsexualism
The classification anxiety towards transsexuals is not isolated,
but reflects a deeper societal discomfort with allowing individuals
to express characteristics and emotions not in conformity with
their biological sex. Feminists, in particular, relate gender discom-
fort with sex-role oppression and view the confinement of opportu-
nities and life experiences based on biology as problematic. The
medical community's response to "gender dysphoria" through sex
reassignment surgery43 fails to remedy the social rejection of indi-
viduals who express non-biologically "appropriate" behavior. The
medical response leaves social constructions of gender unchal-
lenged. Surgery essentially reassigns individuals from an existence
which represents a fundamental challenge to social construction of
gender (i.e., a biological male whose gender identity is female) to
an existence which is no longer threatening (both biologically fe-
male and socially female). A desire to "change one's sex," then, is
ultimately grounded in sex-role stereotyping.44 The sex-change is a
direct result of a medical community (reflecting societal "norms")
which not only promotes the benefits of sex-reassignment surgery,
but actually performs the operations. 45 For women in particular,
43. Sex reassignment surgery may only be a "therapeutic solution" which classifies
"gender dysphoria" as a "profound . . .discomfort ... [over] one's physical sex." Richard
Ekins, On Male Femaling: A Grounded Theory Approach to Cross-Dressing and Sex-
Changing, 41 THE SOCIOLOGcAL RE V. 1, 3 (1993).
Janice Raymond states:
It is significant that there is no specialized or therapeutic vocabulary of black dis-
satisfaction, black discomfort, or black dysphoria that have been institutionalized
in black identity clinics. Likewise, it would be rather difficult and somewhat hu-
morous to talk about sex-role oppression clinics. What the words gender (when
used in conjunction with gender dissatisfaction, gender discomfort, or gender
dysphoria) ultimately achieves is a classification of sex-role oppression as a thera-
peutic problem amenable to therapeutic solutions.
JANci G. RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL Emn'mE: THE MAKING OF SHE-MALE 9 (1990). If the
classification is "amenable to therapeutic solutions" as Raymond suggests, then "appropri-
ate" gender role behaviors are left unchallenged. Raymond's use of the racial metaphor
shows the invisibility of gender. Had this been an attempt to define a discourse grounded in
racial transgression, therapeutic solutions would seem incredulous.
44. RAYMoND, supra note 43, at 27.
45. Id. at 25.
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sex reassignment is an anomaly. Given patriarchal society's resis-
tance to legitimize women's "masculine" characteristics, the social
response to male to female transsexuals and female to male
transsexuals differs. This difference is directly related to sexual
stereotypes which maintain the status quo and male privilege. 46
"Women have been assimilated into the transsexual world, as
women are assimilated into other women defined worlds, institu-
tions and roles, that is, on man's terms. '47
If "[t]he assumption is that there are two and only two gen-
ders because gender follows from sex,"'48 then a process of trans-
gression or sex reassignment breaks down the binary categorization
inherent in the sex/gender system and thus raises the level of cate-
gorization anxiety.49 To reduce the anxiety, society pressures mas-
culine females and feminine males to match their biological sex
with their gender identity representation through sex based behav-
iors and forced internalized gender recognitionY' This pressure re-
inforces an internal conflict which might lead an emasculated fe-
male or an effeminate male to overcompensate for their
"deficiency."'51 So, if you are a man, you must perform as a
man-thus masculine.
The transsexual then, may in fact be a feminist symbol of gen-
der deconstruction.5 2 Like feminist theory, the transsexual rejects
46. Male privilege is tied to sex/gender differentiation which is one of the bases for
political and economic privileging in a society. Isabel Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out:
Reflections on the History of Divorce Law Reform in New York State, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 375,
382 (1989).
47. RAYMOND, supra note 43, at 27.
48. Anne Herrman, Passing Women, Performing Men, 30 MICH. Q. REv. 60, 62 (1991).
49. "Sexual ambiguity always threatens the status quo, a system of power relations that
have arisen around assumptions of two dichotomous, distinct sexes." Pagliassotti, supra
note 6, at 475.
50. Anne Herrman suggests that gender is a performance in the sense of passing (pass-
ing as a woman or passing as a man). Passing is significant in that it highlights the instabil-
ity of gender identity and ability to change sexes in at least a representational sense, if not a
more figurative sense. On both levels, passing has a destabilizing effect on the sex/gender
system. By focussing on passing, the transsexual debate shifts from gender differentiation
to gender attribution. Herrman, supra note 48, at 60-62.
51. Compensating for this deficiency might lead an individual to undergo genital sur-
gery. Kate Bornstein claims that this demand is largely a result "of the cultural genital
imperative." BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 119. Indeed, there is also a continuum of individ-
ual comfort ranging from genital surgery at one extreme to dressing up on occasion at the
other. Id. Whatever point one might lie on the continuum, the cultural pressure is the same.
52. Janice Raymond would disagree with such a statement. For example, she would
argue that the transsexual lesbian-feminist is a violation of women's sexuality and spirit
through deception. RAYMOND, supra note 43, at 104. Despite a legitimate fear of deception,
such a claim falls prey to biological determinism which runs counter to its deconstruction.
This separatist division (of women born women or men born men), I believe, reinforces the
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the societal assumption that their own gender implicitly follows
from sex. Rather, feminism argues that "[a] person should be enti-
tled to chose his or her own destiny, identity, gender, and sex...
[s]ociety ought not to deny these human rights." ' s The growing
symbol metaphorically brings choice to a sacred cow of societal
norms: that gender is biologically defined. By doing so, the dis-
course encourages deconstruction of the "natural" categories of
"woman" and "man" and "male" and "female."
In short, the transsexual in transition is the most visible sym-
bol of the transgendered54 who exemplifies a patriarchal resistance
to the recognition that gender does not inherently follow from sex.
The reality of sex reassignment surgery bolsters society's dogmatic
allegiance to binary thinking and prevents true discourse on the
underlying classification anxiety. As a result, it isn't only the
transsexual in transition who is not accorded recognition of his or
her "true sex, ' '5  but all transgendered persons as well.
Needless to say, this is not just a philosophical tryst into the
world of semantics, metaphysics and the logic of identity. Rather,
it is significant in that this emerging discourse illustrates a legal
system that still insists on assigning gender based on cultural ste-
reotypes of sex, and a legal system that fails to clearly recognize
the distinction between sex and gender.
binary construction of gender.
Some might interpret such a symbol as a call for a post-gendered society. The removal
of gendered terms, however, doesn't guarantee a deconstruction of power relations associ-
ated with the gendered discourse. For example:
The fantasy of a "third sex"-or of being "beyond sex," that is to say outside time-
is one of the most pernicious illusions of our era. Not only does it betray a deep
sense of discontent and dissatisfaction, it also stresses the difficulty of coming to
terms with time, which I see as symptomatic of the postmodern disorder.
Pagliassotti, supra note 6, at 490 (quoting R. Braldotti, Organs Without Bodies, 1 DIFFER-
ENCES 147, 157). The transgendered as a feminist symbol celebrates ambiguity and fluidity
of gender, that we can be empowered to chose gender, that it is not assigned at birth, nor is
it unalterable or prescribed over time.
53. Alec Samuels, Once a Man, Always a Man: Once a Woman, Always a Woman: Sex
Change and the Law, 24 MAn. Sci & L. 163, 166 (1984).
54. This term reflects the transsexual's resistance to a gender identity based on biologi-
cal sex. As such, the transgendered individual embraces the metaphysical third sex and
third gender.
55. The "true sex" is a definition which is not limited to a strict biological interpreta-
tion of sex. Rather, the "true sex" gives deference to one's subjective sense of gender iden-
tity. By doing so, there is a more harmonious definition.
56. This language is Anthony Appiah's. See Appiah, supra note 3, at 493.
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II. THE LEGAL DETERMINATION OF SEX
A. The Cultural Medical Background
The case of an intersexed infant 57 offers an unusual opportu-
nity to examine the factors considered when determining one's sex.
While the chromosomal and hormonal makeup is medically recog-
nized as the actual sex of an intersexed infant, the medical com-
munity, as a mirror of social "norms," takes other factors into ac-
count when determining or assigning sex.58 Generally, these are the
size of the penis or clitoris and the "capacity of the vagina" to be
penetrated by a penis.59 For the intersexed, cultural determina-
tions of sex are premised on social constructions of gender, thus
intersexuality is generally considered a "treatable6 0 calamity of the
genitals. '61
For the intersexed, genital size plays a crucial role in deter-
mining sex. In fact, "male" is medically defined most often by the
condition of having an "appropriately" sized penis-large enough
for penetration, 2 and not by a chromosomal test. This reference
shows the weight of the male standard: if the penis is too small,
then the infant is female.63 Accordingly, the genitals are viewed as
57. The intersexed infant possesses ambiguous sex characteristics. At the time of birth
it is impossible to determine whether the infant is male or female.
58. Suzanne J. Kessler, The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Management of
Intersexed Infants, 16 SIGNS 3, 3 (1990).
59. Id. Penetration is the most significant cultural feature of the penis. An inadequately
sized penis is unable to penetrate and thus engage in heterosexual intercourse. This inability
is at the heart of an anxiety filled gender classification. For the female, however, the only
concern of the capacity of the vagina is its ability to be penetrated by a penis. Id. at 20.
Thus, if it is the adequacy of the penis which defines "maleness" then a person who identi-
fies as male, but who has an inadequate penis or a micropenis (in essence a clitoris) is seen
as having no alternative but to construct an adequate penis through surgery in order to
truly identify as "male."
60. The treatment is based on the assumption that gender identity is malleable up until
about eighteen months of age. Id. at 6-7. This theory was first proposed by John Money,
J.G. Hampson, and J.L. Hampson in 1955 and later developed by Money and Anke
Ehrhardt in 1972. Id. at 6. The following must be assured: (1) parents cannot doubt the sex
of the child; (2) genitals must be altered to match the assigned gender immediately; (3)
hormones are administered at puberty; and (4) the child must be told about their situation.
Id. It is argued that if all these conditions are met, the transition will be smooth and the
person will not demand reassignment later in life. Id.
61. Kessler argues that intersexuality is treatable in part due to three factors: (1) ad-
vancements in surgical procedures; (2) the growth of the feminist movement which has chal-
lenged the valuation of women solely by reproductive ability; and (3) the shift from "gender
role" to "gender identity" which assigns an identity early on in development. Id. at 6.
62. Anne Herrman labels the penis the "cultural genital" and argues that it continues
to be determinative of the essential sign of sex. Herrman, supra note 48, at 63.
63. This plays to the heart of male anxiety - adequate penis size. The ambiguity of
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underdeveloped (clitoris) rather than overdeveloped (phallus). The
push toward surgical correction is a form of constructing both sex
and gender. Surgery is not performed "because it is threatening to
the infant's life but because it is threatening to the infant's cul-
ture. '' s4 Legitimizing sex assignment on genital possession is in es-
sence a cultural valuation of male and female standards of ade-
quacy (genital size, ability and capacity).
However, this was not always the case. During the Renais-
sance, for example, categorizing based on genitals was impossible
since it was recognized that "one's genitals might change over [the
course of] one's life time."6' 5 Sex assignment instead was often de-
termined by "gender displays" such as clothing or behavior.66 Sex
assignment based on gender display was legally reinforced and il-
lustrates the "state's power over the body. '67
It wasn't until the late 18th and early 19th century that bio-
logical sex determination (biological sex signifier) won out over cul-
tural gender determination (cultural sex signifier) . The medical
and legal community became enthralled with genital determina-
tion. The equation was simple: Penis equals boy, vagina equals girl.
Presence of (or absence of) the genital represented one's true sex.69
By the 20th century, the existence of biological sex signifiers
were viewed as "natural" truths, and the legitimization of sex cate-
gorization was born. With increasing medical technology, methods
of categorization were further developed. Modern biological sex
signifiers examine not only genitals, but chromosomes and hor-
mones as well.70 Through establishing the true sex of the transsex-
intersexed infants calls this anxiety into play by allowing this attribute to be the controlling
factor in gender assignment.
64. Kessler, supra note 58, at 25. Kessler states that the medical community has been
unable to find any physical health reason for correction except for psychological ones. Id.
65. Pagliassotti, supra note 6, at 478. Pagliassotti offers the example that men often
became eunuchs or women. Id.
66. Id. Other cultures celebrate a less rigid construction of sex. For example, in most
Shamanic cultures, spiritual leaders must first undergo a period of ceremonial rite where
they live as another gender. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 48.
67. Pagliassotti, supra note 6, at 479.
68. Id.
69. Alternatively, the Kodiak Islanders assigned a female gender to a child with a penis.
These children were viewed as good luck. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 22. In Native Ameri-
can communities the transgendered are known as berdache. Id.
70. Despite the chromosomal test, which has gained significant recognition, the medical
profession has recognized several additional tests for sex classification: (1) gonadal sex; (2)
internal organs, other than gonads; (3) hormones; (4) external genitalia; (5) secondary sex
characteristics; and (6) psychological sex. Comment, Is He or Isn't She? Transsexualism:
Legal Impediments to Integrating a Product of Medical Definition and Technology, 21
WASHBURN L. J. 342, 342 n.1 (1982) [hereinafter Is He or Isn't She].
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ual, the medical community created the illusion of a hidden sex
which can only be uncovered by medical technology.
B. The Legal Reinforcement
The legal community reinforces the assignment of appropriate
gender roles by interpreting the medical determination of sex. This
assignment is hidden as a natural extension of one's sex despite
the fact that the legal reinforcement is culturally determined. With
regard to transsexuals, the steps for legal gender construction are
as follows. First, the medical community constructs the transsex-
ual's true sex.7 1 Second, the legal community responds by directing
and restricting the ways the transsexual can live as reassigned. In
essence, the medical community determines the status of biology,
while the legal community determines the status of one's body
(how to live assigned to a particular sex). 72
The appropriate legal "test" for determining sex is of central
importance for transsexuals .7 A string of New York cases,7 "4 al-
though primarily dealing with the validity of sex designation
changes on birth certificates, can be read as setting forth a legal
test for determining the transsexual's actual sex. 5 Anonymous v.
71. For example, for the male-to-female transsexual this means the removal of external
sexual organs and construction of an artificial vagina through plastic surgery. The surgery is
supplemented by hormone therapy which effects other sex characteristics such as breast
development and voice alteration. Despite the significant changes which result from hor-
mone treatments and surgery, sex-reassignment will not change the "innate" or chromo-
somal sex of an individual. See, e.g., Thomas N. Wise & Jon K. Meyer, Transvestism: Previ-
ous Findings and New Areas for Inquiry, 6 J. OF SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 116, 116-20
(1980); Comment, The Law & Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Di-
lemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 288, (1975). Alternatively, some critics argue that it is necessary to
look beyond chromosomes for true sex determination, by weighing other factors such as
psychological sex or gender roles. See, e.g., Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment
Surgery and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 963, 965 (1971).
72. The medical determination of "sex" can be understood as the status of biological
identity, while the legal reinforcement, which governs how you "live as that sex," is more
about identity, representation and how you are perceived byrothers in the world (this is
gender).
73. It has been asserted that a legal test for determining sex for transsexuals is more
preferable than other tests because the law "tak[es] into account a much wider range of
factors or criteria than purely medical or scientific ones." Samuels, supra note 53, at 165.
74. Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966); In re Anonymous, 293
N.Y.S.2d 834 (Civ. Ct. 1968); Hartin v. Director of Bureau of Records, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515
(Sup. Ct. 1973); Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
75. Sex determination is governed by state law. For example, Illinois allows adults to
change their birth certificate to reflect a change in sex after proof of surgery is submitted to
the court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 410, §535/17(1)(d) (West Supp. 1993). However, the New York
Academy of Medicine has argued that despite changes in one's genitalia, the public interest
against fraud cannot be outweighed by a person's desire to conceal their "original" sex. Har-
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Weiner 6 was the first United States case about the legal status of
transsexuals. A female post-operative transsexual applied for a new
birth certificate to reflect her change in sex. The New York City
Department of Health deferred to the New York Academy of
Medicine for help in analyzing post-operative status.
The Academy determined that sex designation changes to
birth certificates should not be allowed for the following three rea-
sons: (1) post operative transsexuals are still chromosomally their
pre-operative status; (2) legal records, such as birth certificates,
should not be used to help psychologically ill persons; and (3) the
public interest to protect against fraud outweighs the transsexual's
desire to conceal his or her change in sex. 7 The court, in essence,
upheld the Academy's position, since it found that the question
was administrative in nature. As such, any judicial determination
would be an usurpation of the Board's authority. 8
Some courts have found Weiner's chromosomal test for sex il-
logical. For example, the court in In re Anonymous7 9 asked:
"[s]hould the question of a person's identity be limited by the re-
sults of mere histological section or biochemical analysis, with a
complete disregard for the human brain, the organ responsible for
most functions and reactions . . . including sex orientation? I
think not."8' 0
The possibility of prescribing the adoption of a psychological
test, instead of a chromosomal test, was unsuccessful in Hartin v.
Director of Bureau of Records.8' The court concluded that post-
operative transsexuals are still chromosomally unalterable, and
thus, birth certificates should only reflect the sex of the person at
birth. The court reached such a result because "[t]he chromosomal
tin, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 518. Other states which permit sex designation changes after sex-reas-
signment surgery, and their relevant statutory cites, are as follows: Arizona (ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-326(A)(4) (1993)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406(f) (Michie 1991));
California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10475 (West 1991)); District of Columbia (D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-217(d) (1989)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e) (1991)); Hawaii (HA-
WAII REV. STAT. § 338-17.7(a)(4)(B) (Supp. 1994)); Iowa (IowA CODE ANN. § 144.23(3) (West
Supp. 1993)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:62(A) (West 1993)); Massachusetts
(MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 13 (West Supp. 1994)); Michigan (MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.2831(c) (West 1992)); Mississippi (MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-57-21 (1993)); New Mexico
(N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-25(D) (1994)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4)
(1992)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 432.290(5) (1993)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2-11
(1989 & Supp. 1995)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269(E) (1992)).
76. 270 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
77. Id. at 322.
78. Id. at 321.
79. 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
80. Id.
81. 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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test was in vogue because surgery for the transsexual [was] an ex-
perimental form of psychotherapy by which mutilating surgery is
conducted on a person with the intent of setting his mind at ease,
and that nonetheless, [did] not change the body cells governing
sexuality.""2
Although preceding cases refused to grant a change of sex des-
ignation, Anonymous v. Mellon8 3 departed slightly from the rea-
soning articulated in Weiner and Hartin. The court in Mellon
stated that sex may be determined by other factors beyond a sole
chromosome test. However, given the fact that petitioner in that
case had already undergone sex reassignment surgery, the question
of petitioner's sex was moot. Nevertheless, Mellon is significant
since the court stated that once provided with a justiciable contro-
versy the court might be required to determine which factors
should be used for sex designation.
The chromosomal test was explicitly rejected in Richards v.
United States Tennis Association.8 4 Renee Richards, a profes-
sional tennis player, who had undergone sex reassignment surgery,
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Tennis Associa-
tion's reliance on a sex-chromatin test. Richards, a post-operative
male to female transsexual wished to compete in the United States
Women's Open. The Tennis Association wanted to determine
whether Richards was "truly" female and thus able to compete in
the Women's division. Richards claimed that the sex-chromatin
test was unfair and insufficient for the "purposes of excluding indi-
viduals from sports events on the basis of gender. '8 5
The court provided a brief history of the sex-chromatin test
and explained that the test looks for the presence of a second x
chromosome to determine if the subject is a "normal" female, since
the male has a y chromosome instead.8 Since the test does not
determine the presence of the y chromosome, persons with chro-
mosomal defects may not be definitively classified by the test
alone. The court concluded that the sex-chromatin test as applied
to this plaintiff as the sole determination of sex was "grossly un-
fair, discriminatory and inequitable. 8 7 The court, in adopting the
reasoning argued by Richards that the sex-chromatin test was in-
82. Sherrie L. Kopka, The Legal Status of the Postoperative Transsexual: The Grey
Gelding Ain't What He Used to Be, or the Grass Isn't Always Greener, in MEDICAL TRIAL
TECHNIQUE QUARTERLY 1983 ANNUAL 456, 461 (Fred Lane et al. eds., 1983).
83. 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
84. 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
85. Id. at 268.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 272-73.
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adequate, stated:
[t]he Barr [body] test, would classify Dr. Richards as a male and despite the
fact that the chromosomes may appear to be that of a man, if she has the
external genital appearance, the internal organ appearance, gonadal iden-
tity, endocrinological makeup and psychological and social development of a
female, she would be considered a female by any reasonable test of
sexuality. 8
The move to a more harmonized approach for sex determina-
tion is found in the recent, but small, body of transsexual marriage
case law.89 Transsexuals, in claiming a valid marriage, face the
unique challenge of having to overcome the requirement that a
marriage is the legal union between a man and a woman.00 A
transsexual marriage, therefore, is only legally valid when the
transsexual's sex is determined to be opposite their spouse's sex.91
The leading case which denied the validity of transsexual mar-
riages was Corbett v. Corbett."2 This 1970 English decision held
that biological sex is determined at birth and is unalterable even
after sex reassignment surgery. The controlling aspect, according
to the court, of a valid marriage is a union based on sex and not on
gender."' The Corbett court, in holding the transsexual marriage
void, failed to challenge the cultural construction of gender roles
and the biological determinism at work in limiting concepts of sex.
[A male transsexual is unable to function as] a person who is naturally ca-
pable of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage. In other
words, the law should adopt in the first place ... the chromosomal, gonadal
and genital tests, and if all three are congruent, determine the sex for the
purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative intervention.9
The reasoning in Corbett was rejected in M.T. v. J.T.9 5 There,
plaintiff, a post operative female transsexual, filed for support and
maintenance in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Her
husband raised the defense that his wife was really male and there-
fore the marriage was void. Although the court in M.T. upheld the
88. Id. at 271.
89. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. A transsexual marriage, for example,
might be comprised of John, a post operative "male" transsexual, who marries Jane, who is
not a transsexual.
90. Is He or Isn't She, supra note 70, at 347 & n.38.
91. See id. at 347-49. Thus, in the preceding example, supra note 89, if John is not
recognized as "male," then the marriage would be void, since it is the union of two females.
92. [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306.
93. Id. at 1325.
94. Id. at 1324-25.
95. 355 A.2d 204, 208-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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opposite sex requirement for a valid marriage, the court replaced
the biological determinism standard adopted in Corbett. The court
reasoned that "if the anatomical or genital features of a genuine
transsexual are made to conform to the person's gender, psyche or
psychological sex, then identity by sex must be governed by the
congruence of these standards."' 6 In essence, once psychological,
social, and biological aspects are harmonized, the post-operative
transsexual may be legally recognized as the acquired sex.
After a sex-change, the resulting legal conundrum can be
summed up in four words: What sex am I? Possibly, courts are
moving away from strict chromosome tests and biological deter-
minism to a more harmonized approach. Nevertheless, a well de-
fined standard has not yet been reached. The cases do establish,
however, that despite rhetoric, courts can comprehend the difficult
concepts of sex and gender.
C. Incorporating Legal and Medical Definitions of Gender
For the transsexual, actualizing gender requires two steps:
gender identity (subjective identity) and gender attribution (out-
ward manifestation). 7 The first, gender identity, requires the
transsexual to break down social barriers and recognize that his or
her gender does not conform to his or her biological sex. It is cru-
cial that the transsexual overcome the assumption that being ge-
netically female means a correlating female gender identity. It is
only by identifying one's gender that a transsexual can move to-
wards gender attribution.
Announcing gender is significant for two reasons. First, it is a
form of social communication which conveys a person's gender
identity. Second, the way gender is perceived by others effects the
way others relate to that person. Gender is announced through
physical cues, behavioral cues, textual cues, mythic cues, power
cues and sexual orientation cues. 8 These cues perpetuate a system
of association that is deemed natural. Imagine you are trying to be
taken for male. Which cues would lead an observer to easily con-
clude "that is obviously a man"? Clothing, for example, is one
96. Id. at 209.
97. WOODHOUSE, supra note 13, at 6. The process can be understood as including four
aspects: (1) gender assignment; (2) gender identity; (3) gender roles; and (4) gender attribu-
tion which answers the following questions respectively: (1) "This is what you are." BORN-
STEIN, supra note 7, at 22; (2) "Who am I?" Id. at 24; (3) "How do I need to function so that
society perceives me as belonging or not belonging to a specific gender?" Id. at 26; and (4) Is
that a man or a woman? Id. The first two aspects are forms of gender identity while the
final two are forms of gender appearance.
98. BORNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 26-30.
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physical cue which might signal gender appearance. Clothing "is
neither neutral nor meaningless, rather it is a way of saying some-
thing and is, therefore, a form of social communication."9 Indeed,
the manifestation of gender appearance, in threatening social
"norms," presents a legal conundrum.
Doe v. Boeing Co.100 provides an excellent example of the diffi-
culty in announcing gender. In Doe, a transsexual' employee was
discharged for non-compliance with the employer's dress policy.
Doe sought damages for employment discrimination alleging an
unaccommodated handicap under Washington's Law Against Dis-
crimination. 0 2 Doe was told by her employer that while she was an
anatomical male, she couldn't dress in "feminine attire."'1 8 Doe
was discharged after she refused to remove a strand of pink
pearls.10 4
The trial court found that the employer had reasonably ac-
commodated Doe. 10 5 However, the court of appeals held that since
Doe was "handicapped" within the meaning of the statute, the em-
ployer failed to take her unique characteristics into account and
thus "Doe had a 'medically documented need' to dress as a wo-
man.' -106 The Washington Supreme Court, in reviewing the deci-
sion, focused on determining what constituted reasonable accom-
modation and whether the employer had a duty to accommodate
Doe's manner of dressing prior to her genital surgery. The court
99. WOODHOUSE, supra note 13, at 10.
100. 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993).
101. Doe was a biological male who was planning to undergo sex-reassignment surgery.
Working in the desired gender is the final prerequisite for surgery. See id. at 533 (discussing
the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Standards).
102. Id. at 532. Washington's Law Against Discrimination states that an employer can-
not "'discharge or bar any person from employment because of age, sex, marital status,
race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handi-
cap.'" Id. at 534 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180(2)). The definition for handicap for
purposes of determining whether an unfair practice has occurred provides that "'a person
will be considered to be handicapped by a sensory, mental, or physical condition if he or she
is discriminated against because of the condition and the condition is abnormal.'" Id. at
534-35 (quoting WASH. ADLUN. CODE § 162-22-040(1)(a)).
The statutory language requires first that an abnormal condition be present. Once this
is shown, then it must be shown that the discrimination is because of that abnormal condi-
tion. The Doe court relied on the fact that gender dysphoria is an abnormal, medically cog-
nizable condition with a prescribed course of treatment. Id. at 536. Yet, applying the second
level of scrutiny, the court was not able to hold that the employer discriminated against Doe
because of her condition. Id. at 538.
103. Id. at 532.
104. Id. at 534.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 534, 537 (quoting Doe v. Boeing Co., 823 P.2d 1159, 1164 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992), rev'd, 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993)).
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was unwilling to expand the scope of accommodation to include an
employee's precise needs, rather, it included those steps reasona-
bly necessary to enable Doe to perform her job.107 The court con-
cluded that the accommodation test was sufficiently met by al-
lowing Doe to wear unisex clothing at work.10
When Doe is considered with the medical requirement that
transsexuals who wish to undergo surgery must assume the role of
the preferred sex at least one year prior to surgery, its result can-
not be logically resolved. Given this year requirement, the court
should have allowed Doe to express herself as female, and more
significantly, should have viewed gender appearance as an absolute
step, yet culturally imposing, towards recognizing the true sex for
the transsexual in transition. The court's adherence to a unisex
standard 09 of dressing fails to recognize the unique task of meet-
ing medical guidelines and misrepresents the importance of gender
attribution along a sexual continuum. It is not enough to treat Doe
the same as other employees. 110
If the essence of transsexualism is understood as the demand
to live in the gender opposite to one's anatomical sex, 1 then the
transsexual in transition who begins a process of recreating their
gendered appearance through dress puts him or herself in a preca-
rious position. The legal community must overcome society's bi-
nary construction of gender and recognize that gender expression
may not conform with sex. Leaving the transsexual in transition
legally unprotected through the neutrality justification as an ap-
proach to gender is an insufficient solution. 112
107. See id. at 534.
108. Id. at 538.
109. A unisex expression is not sufficient. Transsexuals who have waited all this time to
finally become the preferred gender do not wish to express themselves in a "unisexed" im-
age. Instead, they wish to express themselves along very specific gender lines with specific
male or female characteristics. Most transsexuals have been struggling with an ambiguous
gender identity all their lives. The unisexed image reinforces the ambiguity they have been
running from.
110. An equally applied standard is not sufficient for protecting transsexuals for accom-
modation purposes. Arguing for "special accommodation" however, raises a number of con-
cerns: (1) if transsexuals have a uniqueness that justifies "special accommodation" then they
deserve special treatment; (2) special treatment implies that transsexuals are "different";
and (3) being "different" implies inferiority.
111. DocmTa, supra note 21, at 26.
112. Perhaps if we lived in a culture which was not obsessed with bipolar classifications,
then this unisex standard would be adequate. Nonetheless, given the reality that many
women are still not able to wear pants at work, a unisex standard fails to challenge why
standards of dressing are inadequate for men and women.
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III. LAW AS AN EXPRESSION OF GENDER ANXIETY (THE CASE FOR
A METAPHYSICAL THIRD SEX AND THIRD GENDER)
The failure to recognize the semantic distinction between sex
and gender has lead to a blurring of the sex/gender distinction. For
legal discourse, this blurring has created a new level of fuzziness.
By according separate and distinct meanings to sex and gender,
areas of the law, which traditionally have been shaped by biologi-
cal determinism and cultural constructions of gender, will no
longer be restricted by a binary construction of sex and gender.
Challenging the binary construction requires the law to create a
self-conscious definition of sex and gender. Indeed, the blurring of
the sex/gender distinction has resulted in an irresponsible and un-
faithful use of "sex" in legal discourse. Unknowingly, courts may
be using the term "sex" when they really mean gender.
The employment discrimination arena is especially ripe for a
discussion of this unconscious cross-section of sex and gender. In
attempting to define a richer meaning of sex, this section, in apply-
ing a self-conscious definition of sex and gender, will argue that the
occasional substitution of "gender" for "sex" is not an accident.
Rather, it is a legal recognition that the definition of "sex" (which
on the surface seems to be limited to a functionalist and biological
meaning) includes the characteristics of gender: representation and
identity. Such a recognition could expand Title VII coverage from*
the present functionalist meaning of "sex" to "true sex" which en-
compasses "gender" and "gender identity."
A. Sex as "Sex"
A growing body of legal scholarship has examined whether Ti-
tle VII coverage should be extended to transsexuals. 11 3 Title VII
provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.11 4
The remedial purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to
provide minorities (based on nationality, race and religion) a fair
113. D. Douglas Cotton, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines: Title VII and Transsexualism, 80
Nw. U. L. REv. 1037 (1986).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).
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opportunity for competition in the market.115 Title VII was in-
tended to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment" based on sex.1 6 A "clear meaning" reading of Title
VII's legislative history supports the hypothesis that Congress did
not intend to extend protection to transsexuals with the inclusion
of the word sex in Title VII. In fact, Title VII was originally writ-
ten to prohibit employment discrimination based only on race and
national origin. The sex amendment to Title VII was proposed by
Representative Howard Smith of Virginia as a strategy to defeat
passage of the bill. 117 His attempt was unsuccessful and the bill
passed by a vote of 168 to 133.118 Such an insignificant legislative
history, with regard to the inclusion of the word sex, has been det-
rimental in attempting a broader reading of the word sex.
This legislative history, with its limited sex discourse, has
proven, in particular, to be an obstacle in extending Title VII cov-
erage to transsexuals. An example of the detrimental effect of Con-
gressional oversight is seen in Doe v. United States Postal Ser-
vice."' In 1984, the press picked up the story of "Jane Doe," a
transsexual who applied for a temporary position at the U.S. Pos-
tal Service as a Senior Clerk Typist.120 Doe was still "male" when
she was offered the temporary position.' 2 ' Prior to beginning em-
ployment, Doe notified her supervisor of her desire to undergo sex
reassignment surgery and requested starting work as a woman,
rather than change her appearance during employment. 22 There-
after, the employment offer was rescinded. Even though Doe of-
fered to postpone the surgery, she was again refused employ-
ment. 2 As a result, Doe initiated an action alleging discrimination
115. Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1166 (1971). It has been stated that the
primary purpose of the Act "is to require employers to make employment-related determi-
nations about their workers on the basis of each person's characteristics, so as to render
irrelevant the employee's social, sexual, ethnic or religious background." Fletcher v. Greiner,
435 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (citing Ste. Marie v. Eastern Railroad Assoc., 458 F.
Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). Additionally, it was intended to regulate the disparate treat-
ment of women and men as a result of sex stereotypes. Id. at 1009-10.
116. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S, 424, 431 (1971).
117. 110 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964).
118. Id. at 2584.
119. No. CIV.A.84-3296, 1985 WL 9446 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985).
120. Philip Smith, Applicant Who Had Sex Change Sues Postal Service Over Job Of-
fer, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1984, at B9.
121. Doe v. United States Postal Service, No. CIV.A.84-3296, 1985 WL 9446, at *1
(D.D.C. June 12, 1985).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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based on sex under Title VII. T'2
The court held that Doe failed to state a claim under Title
VII.125 In doing so, the court relied solely on the plain language of
Title VII and its inconclusive legislative history. Without reaching
the merits of Doe's claim, the court reasoned that given the ab-
sence of legislative history suggesting otherwise, Congress intended
the word "sex" to refer to biology.1 26 The court's alleged deference
to Congressional intent conveniently allowed it to escape con-
fronting the real issues of the case, specifically, whether discrimi-
nation on the basis of a "sexual identity disorder" is synonymous
with discrimination based upon an individual's sex.127
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson and Co., 28 like Doe, also re-
stricted the meaning of the term "sex" to its plain meaning for
Title VII purposes. In Holloway, however, the court was at least
forced to confront the serious question of whether the true mean-
ing of the word "sex" is synonymous with gender, and as such,
whether it encompasses transsexuals. 29
In Holloway, appellant, a pre-operative "female" transsex-
ual, °3 0 was discharged after she requested a change in company
records to reflect her present "female" name.' 3' Holloway claimed
that her employer discriminated against her on account of her sex
and therefore violated Title VII.' 3 ' The court, citing Title VII's
legislative history, concluded that since the clear legislative inten-
tion was to give women an equal opportunity in the workplace, 38 it
had only traditional notions of sex in mind.13 4 As such, the court
adopted a restrictive view of Title VII and failed to find a richer
124. Id. Doe also alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791,
et seq., of her rights to equal protection and due process under the Fifth Amendment and of
her constitutional right to privacy. Id. at *2-5.
125. Id. at *2.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
129. Id. at 662. The centrality of gender to this case is evidenced by Ms. Passard's
(Holloway's supervisor) affidavit which stated that the real reason for Holloway's termina-
tion was because of her gendered appearance and not her transsexualism. Id. at 661 n.1.
130. Ramona Holloway was born Robert Holloway. She began female hormone treat-
ments and was waiting to undergo sex reassignment surgery. Id. at 661.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. For cases that have interpreted this legislative intention see Baker v. California
Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
134. The fact that several bills seeking to amend the Civil Rights Act to include "sexual
preference" have been introduced is seen as further support for Congress' intention for a
clear and traditional meaning of "sex." Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662.
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meaning of the word sex.
Holloway claimed that a richer meaning lied in finding the
word sex to be synonymous with gender.'35 Relying on Congres-
sional intent, plus the Legislature's refusal to amend the Civil
Rights Act to prohibit discrimination against "sexual preference,"
the court reasoned that since Title VII does not encompass dis-
crimination against homosexuals, Congress had no other intention
than its strict biological meaning. 136 As a result, the court was un-
willing to equate gender with sex.
Justice Wood, the Circuit Judge presiding over Ulane v. East-
ern Airlines, Inc.,57 was also unwilling to equate gender with
sex.138 This is evidenced by his opening sentence which reads
"[p]laintiff, as Kenneth Ulane, was hired in 1968 as a pilot for de-
fendant, Eastern Airlines, Inc., but was fired as Karen Francis
Ulane in 1981."'' 31 Such an opening foreshadows the court's ulti-
mate determination that "even if one believes that a woman can be
so easily created from what remains of a man, that does not decide
this case .... [S]ince Title VII is not so expansive in scope as to
prohibit discrimination against transsexuals... we remand for en-
try of judgment in favor of Eastern."'4 0
Ulane claimed that her discharge was a violation of Title VII's
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.' 4 ' The dis-
trict court ruled in her favor holding that Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of Ulane's transsexualism. 142 The Seventh
Circuit, however, reversed, claiming that Title VII does not protect
transsexuals. 4 3 In doing so, the circuit court relied heavily on the
growing transsexual jurisprudence which holds that the term "sex"
in Title VII is not synonymous with "sexual preference,"1 4 nor, as
135. Id.
136. Id. at 662-63.
137. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1017 (1985).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1082.
140. Id. at 1087.
141. Id. The second count claimed that Ulane was discriminated against as a female.
Despite the lower court's determination that Ulane was female, the Seventh Circuit was
unwilling to view plaintiff as anything more than "a biological male who takes female hor-
mones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to make it appear to be
female." Id.
142. Id. at 1084.
143. Id.
144. Id. These cases include: Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750
(8th Cir. 1982); DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th
Cir. 1979); Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978); Holloway
v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies
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the district court had found, that "sex" is synonymous with "sex-
ual identity.' 1 45 In rejecting the sexual identity reasoning of the
district court, Justice Wood argued for an ordinary, common
meaning interpretation of the word sex. 146 He reasoned that had
Congress intended more, a more significant legislative history
would exist.147 Moreover, since attempts to amend Title VII to in-
clude prohibition of discrimination based on "affectional or sexual
orientation"'1 8 had failed, a plain reading is necessary.'
49
Clearly, the remedial purpose of Title VII is to prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. To protect against discrimination,
it is necessary to confront sex stereotypes which justify non-com-
pliance. This challenge is essentially a challenge to the way we per-
ceive a person's ability which is assigned on the basis of sex (biol-
ogy). Since the assignment of ability is gender, and the perception
of this ability is attribution, to effectuate the purpose of Title VII,
sex cannot be limited solely to biology. Instead, it must include
how this biology is translated and perceived by the world.
For the transsexual, this restricted view results in a legal
Catch-22. Once a court concludes that employment termination of
transsexuals is based on a personal choice (i.e., to change biological
sex), it can conclude that no sex discrimination is found. In other
words, the courts interpret the necessity for sex reassignment to
"choice" and not an aspect of the transsexual's "true sex." By ig-
noring gender identity and attribution, the courts have adopted a
binary construction of sex and gender and have refused to accept
the reality that one's gender does not inherently follow from one's
sex. This choice/sex dichotomy, 50 as embraced by the courts,
leaves transsexuals, especially those in transition, without a
Medical Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
1978).
145. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084. The "sexual identity" reasoning of the district court
stems from its acceptance that "'sex is not a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes,' [but
rather] is in part a psychological question-a question of self-perception; and in part a so-
cial matter-a question of how society perceives the individual." Id. (quoting Ulane v. East-
ern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (D. IlM. 1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985)). Such a broad reading of the word sex, the district court
concluded, would further the remedial purpose of Title VII. Id.
146. Id. at 1085.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1086.
150. This dichotomy is highlighted in Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325
(5th Cir. 1978). In Smith, appellant, a male who was denied employment based on his ef-
feminacy, filed suit claiming that discrimination based on affectional or sexual preference
violated Title VII. The court was unwilling to find that the word "sex" in Title VII included
affectional or sexual preference and held that "effeminacy" is a matter of choice.
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remedy.
For example, in Grossman v. Bernards Township Board of
Education,'51 plaintiff, a "female" post-operative transsexual
school teacher, was fired after sex reassignment surgery. Initially
hired as a "male," plaintiff underwent sex reassignment surgery to
align her sex with her female gender identity. The court concluded
that plaintiff was discharged not because of her status as female,
but "because of her change in sex from the male to the female gen-
der. '152 Termination "because of a change in sex" is a disguise for
stereotypical assumptions about the capabilities of males and fe-
males. Grossman was terminated not because her sex "changed,"
but because, despite her sex-change, she was perceived as male (at-
tribution), but with the gender identity of a female.
The court, in Dobre v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., s15
was faced with a similar task, to determine whether Dobre, a pre-
operative female transsexual employed by AMTRAK, was discrim-
inated against because of her gender while in the process of ob-
taining sex reassignment surgery.15 4 Dobre claimed that AM-
TRAK's decision to terminate her while she underwent her real
life test constituted sex-based discrimination under Title VII.
The court, in determining whether plaintiff had a valid claim
under Title VII, concluded that the term "sex" was to be given its
plain meaning and thus construed narrowly.15 5 The court held that
"'sex' in Title VII refers to an individual's distinguishing biologi-
cal or anatomical characteristics, whereas the term 'gender' refers
to an individual's sexual identity."' 56 Accordingly, the court dis-
missed this claim. While the court in Dobre was able to distinguish
between sex and gender and give credence to the concept of a
"true sex," it was not willing to extend Title VII protection to dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual identity. As such, the Dobre
court reinforced societal stereotypes against individuals who exer-
cise gender characteristics not in harmony with their biological sex.
These cases establish that the central component in determin-
151. No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975), afl'd, 538 F.2d 319 (3d
Cir. 1976).
152. Id. at *4.
153. 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
154. Dobre is an example of what I have termed a "transsexual in transition."
155. Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 286.
156. Id. (citing Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir.
1977)). It is interesting to note that sexual ability is closely tied with sexual identity. The
court in M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), stated that if surgery is
successful and the post-operative transsexual is "by virtue of medical treatment, thereby
possessed of the full capacity to function sexually as a male or female... [there is] no legal
barrier [to marriage]." Id. at 210.
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ing whether a transsexual should be considered part of the pro-
tected class for Title VII purposes is biological sex. Although hav-
ing moved from an absolute definition in Doe, to a recognition of
the difference between sex and gender in Holloway and Dobre,
modern jurisprudence still clings to the notion that sex is a func-
tional definition. In effect, the courts have implicitly conveyed that
sex reassignment does not reflect a transsexual's "true sex."
B. Substituting Gender for Sex (The Reality of Gender
Identity and Attribution)
Despite the string of cases mentioned in the preceding section
which accept the sex/gender distinction,115 current legal thought
has not settled on a single definition of sex and gender. Although
the legal community still uses sex and gender interchangeably in
various contexts, some inroads have been made. For example, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
amended its definition of "sex" for purposes of Title VII to include
"'a person's gender, an immutable characteristic with which a per-
son is born.' "" Does this substitution mean fungibility or an ex-
pansion of the meaning of "sex" to include gender? 1 9
157. See supra notes 128-56 and accompanying text.
158. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUm. L. REV. 1158,
1169 (1991) (quoting EEOC Dec. No. 76-75, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 16495, at 4266 (Mar. 2,
1976)).
159. Fair v. Guiding Eyes for the Blind, 742 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), illustrates
the above-mentioned tension. In Fair, plaintiff claimed that her supervisor's incessant con-
versations about his alleged homosexuality was a form of sexual harassment. Id. at 153. The
claim of sexual harassment under Title VII takes two forms: "quid pro quo" sexual harass-
ment and "hostile work environment." Id. at 155 (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986)). Plaintiff alleged her claim under a hostile work environment
theory. Id. The court noted that the requirement for a successful claim is a showing that the
employee is intentionally singled out on the basis of her sex. Id. at 156. In determining
whether plaintiff made such a showing the court stated:
If the acts complained of would be equally offensive to both sexes, then the sub-
ject of the harassment cannot claim to have been singled out because of her sex.
When the comments creating a sexual harassment claim are not linked in any way
to the recipient's gender, there has been no disparate treatment under Title VII.
Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that the plaintiff's supervisor's comments "had
little or nothing to do with the plaintiff's gender." Id. (emphasis added). Although such a
finding was devastating to Fair's case, one could argue that the court, in substituting gender
for sex, engaged in a self-conscious use of the word gender.
The court, in another similar case alleging sexual harassment discrimination, substi-
tuted the word gender for the word sex. In Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
appellant claimed she was fired because she refused her supervisor's demand for sexual fa-
vors. Id. at 985. The court turned to Congressional intent for help in determining whether
this conduct constituted discrimination on the basis of sex and noted the absence of dis-
course. Id. at 986-87. However, the court turned to the 1972 amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-
COLLISION OF SEX AND GENDER
The growing number of sexual orientation cases brought under
Title VII substitute the word "gender" in place of "sex." In De-
Santis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,160 a group of lesbian
and gay plaintiffs claimed defendant violated Title VII since sexual
orientation discrimination was implicit in Title VII's language
prohibiting sex discrimination. The court rejected plaintiffs' argu-
ment, and held that the word "sex" "applies only to discrimination
on the basis of gender and should not be judicially extended to
include sexual preference."' 161 In extending Title VII claims only to
gender based discrimination rather than sexual preference discrim-
ination, the court has demonstrated its ability to distinguish sexual
preference from gender. Sex, gender and sexual preference are
three distinct concepts. The failure to remove sexual preference
from the gender rubric is a classic example of stereotyping what it
means to be male or female. Linking sexual preference with gender
identity reinforces the assumption that all effeminate men are
"fags" or masculine women are "dykes."
As in DeSantis, claims of sexual harassment are unsuccessful
if the basis of the harassment is an individual's sexual orienta-
tion."6 2 However, claims are often successful when the basis of the
harassment is sexual identity. By distinguishing sexual orientation
from sexual identity, some courts have held that sexual orientation
is a matter of preference, while sexual identity is not. 6 ' The con-
cept of immutability may also play a role in signaling preference
and subsequently may limit Title VII coverage to a functionalist
261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. II 1972)), which
discussed discrimination on the basis of sex directly and stated that from this research, "it
[is] evident that Congress was deeply concerned about employment discrimination
founded on gender." Id. at 987 (emphasis added). Thus, the court, in substituting the word
gender for sex, held that appellant's discrimination was based on her gender and this was
prohibited under Title VII. Id. at 995.
The case for expanding the functional meaning of sex to include gender may be sup-
ported by a growing jurisprudence which recognizes the binary construction of sex and gen-
der. Courts, by distinguishing sexual identity cases from sexual orientation cases, may have
opened the door for the argument that due to sex and gender's interchangeable usage, sex
may include gender for employment discrimination purposes.
160. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
161. Id. at 329-30 (emphasis added). See also Capers, supra note 158, at 1177 & n.83.
162. This is because sexual orientation is falsely classified as a form of sexual expres-
sion. Sexual expression (versus conduct for example) has a history of increased governmen-
tal regulation. For example, the Supreme Court, in holding in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973), and Paris v. Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), that sexually oriented
expression is unprotected if it is without redeeming social value, significantly increased its
power to curb sexual expression. See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY FREE
SPEECH, SEX AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN's RIGHTs 52 (1995).
163. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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meaning of sex.1 4 The semi-mutability of sex, however, suggests
that categories of immutability may only be true in the most literal
sense.
[S]ociologists have long posited the basic ascribed identities to be race, sex
and age. These have been presented as unchangeable. In the most literal
sense this is still true. However, we are aware that age identification may be
different from chronological age. Similarly, one born with a "passable" color
and features can deny his racial origins.16"
Moreover, given the semi-mutability of sex, one could argue
that "sex" should not be limited to the physical characteristics of
biology. Rather, the aspect of "sex" which is immutable refers to
gender. This second point is problematic, since its success turns on
a crucial finding that, to be immutable, gender identity is involun-
tary and assigned at birth. Although such an assumption might fit
well in the already existing preference/inherent rationale for Title
VII purposes, ultimately, it reinforces the bipolar sex/gender sys-
tem by falsely holding that gender is assigned at birth and cannot
be chosen. Failing to recognize the concept of gender identity as a
choice falsely classifies the transgendered experience.
Sex reassignment surgery is viewed as medically necessary to
return the pre-operative transsexual to his or her purported sex.
The medical community has reached a consensus in treating
transsexualism: radical surgery is the only successful form of
treatment.
6 6
If there are biological foundations which underlie gender iden-
164. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975), narrowed
the scope of Title VII to opportunities based on immutable characteristics. As a result of
recognizing these immutable characteristics, the court was able to conclude that employers
can impose different hair lengths on male and female employees so long as this is based on
acceptable cultural standards of dress and appearance. Id. at 1092.
In Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the employers
prohibition of braided hairstyles was permissible under Title VII. The court reasoned that
the hairstyle was easily changeable, and failed to see a formal equality concern that gener-
ally braided hairstyles are worn by African-Americans, thus such a prohibition has a dispa-
rate impact, on African-Americans when applied equally. The neutral application of "appro-
priate" hair lengths reinforces the equal application of grooming standards (expected of
both men and women) and thus fails to violate Title VII. Wearing one's hair long or short is
a voluntary act and therefore not an immutable characteristic.
Other employment criteria that impose "neutral" requirements on a sex-specific basis
are weight limits. The court in Jarrell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va.
1977), af'd mem., 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978), took judicial notice that weight restrictions
did not affect an immutable characteristic since it "is a characteristic subject to the reasona-
ble control of most individuals." Id. at 892. The reasonable control standard paves the way
for viewing characteristics as either one of preference or one which is inherent.
165. FEINBLOOM, supra note 1, at 149.
166. Is He or Isn't She, supra note 70, at 359.
[Vol. 43
COLLISION OF SEX AND GENDER
tity, such as gender systems within the brain, then the argument
many transsexuals make of being trapped in the wrong body may
have some merit. Theorists are unclear as to whether prenatal hor-
monal factors are present in utero which may facilitate gender
identity formation.167 Some theorists argue that socialization is the
most important factor for gender identity rather than chromo-
somal sex.16 8 Others claim that "gonadal hormones of the in-
trauterine fetus may play a crucial role in the neurological pro-
gramming of gender."1 69
Biological arguments for gender identity echo a growing theory
that sexual orientation also has a biological substructure. 170 It has
been found that in heterosexual men, the interstitial nucleus of the
anterior hypothalamus is more than twice as large than in homo-
sexual men.1 71 "[T]he hypothalamus is at the center of sexual ori-
entation and . .. there is a difference in its structure and size
which appears to have a direct bearing on the sexual orientation of
an individual.' 7 2
Despite the inconclusiveness of an involuntary explanation for
transsexualism, it is worthy of some discussion. Although the ac-
tual etiology of transsexualism is unknown, 73 there are three medi-
cal theories to transsexualism: biological, gender dysphoric and
psychoanalytic.' 7 The biological findings are as follows: supporting
evidence has shown that transsexualism may be linked to limbic
system abnormalities, which might occur during the earliest stages
of brain development; 7 5 EEG abnormalities might be linked to
transsexualism; 76 there may be unique hormonal factors associ-
ated with transsexualism; 77 and there is a strong link between the
presence or absence of the H-Y antigen and male and female
transsexualism. 7 8 The gender dysphoria theory of transsexualism,
167. DOCTER, supra note 21, at 5.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. C.N. Armstrong & Terrence Walton, Transsexual Metamorphoses, 142 NEw L.J.
96, 96 (1992).
171. Id. at 97.
172. Id.
173. DocTER, supra note 21, at 61-63.
174. Id. at 61-68.
175. Id. at 62.
176. Id. Docter notes that although the significance of abnormal EEG's is elusive, it
must not be ignored. Id.
177. Id. Again, Docter cautions that these findings are not conclusive, but should lead
to further study. Id.
178. Id. at 63. The H-Y antigen is considered to be a powerful genetic triggering agent
in cell differentiation during early fetal development. Some argue that it is necessary for
male development. Since the "H-Y antigen is a genetically potent biological determinant of
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on the other hand, holds that transsexuals suffer from "gender-role
dis-orientation.' ' 179 Although biological factors may be at the core
of transsexualism, learning processes and socialization are instru-
mental in adding to gender dysphoric feelings.1 80 As such, encour-
aging transsexuals to cross dress relieves their feelings of gender
discordance.
Although some theorists reject the view that the cause of
transsexualism is biological,"8 ' many others 82 see either biological
explanations or a combination of biological and sociological factors
manifesting themselves as gender role discordance. The gender
dysphoric approach holds gender discordance as the motivating
factor for transsexuals to express themselves in the opposite sex.
This theory is the most accepted explanation of transsexualism to
date.83
Evidence of the legal acceptance of the involuntariness of
transsexualism is also supported by the transsexual's right to med-
ical assistance for sex reassignment surgery when medically neces-
sary. Determining whether sex reassignment surgery is medically
necessary turns on whether transsexualism is seen as voluntary or
involuntary. 84 Doe v. Minnesota Department of Public Welfare'"e
was the first case to hold that total exclusion of medical assistance,
under the Medicaid Program, for sex reassignment surgery violated
federal regulations. In Doe, a pre-operative female transsexual,
who had lived "as a woman" for ten years, applied for medical cov-
erage for sex reassignment surgery. The Welfare Department de-
nied coverage and relied on the Physicians Handbook which spe-
cifically excluded transsexual surgery plus nine other medical
sex-related attributes," Docter claims this research must be carefully undertaken. Id.
179. Id. at 64. For interesting reading see HARRY BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHE-
NOMENON (1966); Harry Benjamin, Transsexualism and Transvestism, 8 AM. J. PsYcHO-
THERAPY 219 (1954); and Harry Benjamin, Transvestism and Transsexualism, 7 INT'L J.
SEXOLOGY 12 (1953).
180. DoCTER, supra note 21, at 64.
181. Richard Green has written the following leading works in this field: RICHARD
GREEN, SEXUAL IDENTITY CONFLICT IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS (1974); RICHARD GREEN, THE
"SIssY-BoY SYNDROME" AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1987); Richard Green,
Gender Identity in Childhood and Later Sexual Orientation: Follow-Up of 78 Males, 142
Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 339 (1985); and Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by
Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692 (1978).
182. See JOHN MONEY & ANKE A. EHRHARDT, MAN AND WOMAN, BOY AND GIRL (1972).
183. DOCTOR, supra note 21, at 66.
184. For an interesting discussion of voluntariness and involuntariness see Richard
Green, Spelling "Relief" for Transsexuals: Employment Discrimination and the Criteria of
Sex, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 125, 138-39 (1985).
185. 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977).
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services from coverage."'
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that transsexualism was a
complex medical and psychological problem, with surgery being
the only successful treatment known.1 7 Although the court was
unwilling to hold that sex reassignment surgery should automati-
cally be covered under the plan, it did hold that the medical neces-
sity of each applicant should be determined "on a case by case
basis.", 18
Following the reasoning in Doe, both the courts in G.B. v.
Lackner"8 9 and Pinneke v. Preisser'90 rejected the often cited cos-
metic surgery rationale,1 91 concluding that such a determination
needs to be done by a qualified physician on a case by case basis.
The Pinneke court noted that in determining whether sex reas-
signment surgery is medically necessary, the following factors must
occur: (1) the patient's physician determines there is a medical ne-
cessity; and (2) the severity of the necessity determines coverage,
not the disorder from which the person sufferers. 92
Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit, in Rush v. Parham,9 3 dis-
agreed with the district court's ruling that a state medicaid pro-
gram cannot categorically deny funding for transsexual surgery.
19 4
In reversing the district court decision, the appellate court held
that defendants should have been permitted to show whether the
Georgia Department of Medical Assistance bans experimental
treatment, whether transsexual surgery is experimental, and
whether transsexual surgery is inappropriate for the plaintiff. 95 In
writing its decision, the court took judicial notice of those cases
which ordered state Medicaid programs to pay for transsexual sur-
gery. 9 6 Although the court failed to read those cases as giving
blanket authority for coverage of "experimental" surgery, it did
hold that a "state may adopt a definition of medical necessity that
places reasonable limits on a physician's discretion.' 97
186. Id. at 819-20.
187. Id. at 819.
188. Id. at 820.
189. 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Ct. App. 1978).
190. 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980).
191. In G.B. v. Lackner, the Department of Health reasoned that transsexualism sur-
gery was not covered since it changed the external appearance of genitalia and as such, was
cosmetic in nature. G.B., 145 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
192. Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 550.
193. 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980).
194. Id. at 1152.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1157.
197. Id. at 1154.
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The right to medical assistance has even been extended to
transsexual prisoners. In a Seventh Circuit case,9 8 the court, in re-
versing the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for
failure to state a claim, 99 held that the state had an affirmative
obligation under the Eighth Amendment "'to provide persons in
its custody with a medical care system that meets minimal stan-
dards of adequacy.' ,,200 Although the court refused to prescribe
any specific treatment, it did secure the right to appropriate medi-
cal treatment through recognizing a cause of action under the Civil
Rights Act.
In rejecting the cosmetic rationale, the Meriwether court
adopted the view expressed in Sommers v. Budget Marketing,
Inc.2° ' which stated: "[t]ranssexualism is not voluntarily assumed
and is not a matter of sexual preference. '2 0 2 The court relied on
the growing judicial recognition of transsexualism as a complex
medical and psychological problem.2 0 3 Reliance on such precedent
led the court to expressly reject the cosmetic argument of sex reas-
signment surgery to hold that "[t]here is no reason to treat
transsexualism differently than any other psychiatric disorder
plaintiff's complaint does state a 'serious medical need.' ",204
Although the medical community agrees that the exact etiol-
ogy of transsexualism is unknown, recognition of the involuntari-
ness of transsexualism has grown. Indeed, case law has established
that despite an unclear understanding of the "cause" of transsexu-
alism, sex reassignment surgery is considered medically necessary.
Perhaps this response to transsexualism reinforces the transsexual
challenge that gender identity comes first and biological sex, if in-
congruent, realigns later. Perhaps the necessariness of surgery even
suggests that it is not the functional meaning of sex which is de-
fined as immutable, but a broader meaning which includes gender.
Nonetheless, such an underlying rationale provides limited support
for an extension of Title VII protection.
198. Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987).
199. The district court found that Meriwether's request for treatment was not a "seri-
ous" medical need. It categorized plaintiff's request as "'elective medication' necessary only
to maintain 'a physical appearance and life style in order to satisfy [her] psychological be-
lief.'" Id. at 411. Ultimately, the district court adopted the view that such treatment is
cosmetic in nature.
200. Id. (quoting Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Weilman
v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984))).
201. 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
202. Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 412 (citing Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d
748, 748 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987)).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 413.
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A stronger argument, recognizes extending sex to include all
aspects of gender (assignment, identity, roles and attribution). By
including all aspects of gender, one can still argue the voluntari-
ness of gender without fearing a false assignment into the sexual
preference line of reasoning. To avoid this argument, courts must
recognize the difference between gender assignment/identity and
gender attribution. Gender assignment is a choice (I am male or I
am female). How one represents themselves as this gender is also
chosen. If one accepts the proposition that gender doesn't necessa-
rily follow from biological sex, then the social rejection of someone
who identifies and expresses a gender identity not in conformity
with their biological sex is a form of gender attribution discrimina-
tion. Thus, if Bob identifies as Betty and represents herself as a
woman, the observer who says "that's not a woman, that's an ef-
feminate man pretending to be a woman," reinforces a social con-
struction of gender that says men cannot express feminine charac-
teristics, and to be a woman one must have female biology. The
attribution, then, is how the observer perceives this individual. If
the observer falls prey to the bipolar construction of sex/gender,
such a perception simultaneously reinforces stereotypes. Stereo-
types exist because of racial, ethnic and sexual attribution. Sexual
stereotypes are not slurs which deal only with a biological or func-
tional meaning of sex, rather, they are created when the biological
meaning of sex is measured against its social construction-gender.
CONCLUSION
The developing discourse of a continuum of gender and sex
has become fashionable in post-gendered and post-modern scholar-
ship. The concern that such a discourse is unreal and abstract cer-
tainly has some merit. But for the actual being whose life is the
model for this discourse, the continuum of sex and gender are not
textual abstractions.0 5 The complicated interplay between sex and
gender plays out in real human lives. This human dimension re-
minds us why the need for legal protection is so imperative.
We construct ethical identities-woman, man, African-American, "white"-
in ways that depend crucially on false beliefs about metaphysical identi-
ties. . . .But if we were to live in a society that did not institutionalize
those false metaphysical beliefs. . . .In a truly nonsexist, nonracist society,
gender, the ethical identity constructed on the base of sexual differences,
would at least be radically differently configured.
20 °
205. Nancy F. Partner, No Sex, No Gender, 68 SPECULUM: A JOURNAL OF MEDIEVAL
STUDIEs 419, 440 (1983).
206. Appiah, supra note 3, at 499.
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Unfortunately, we do not live in a society that is nonsexist.
Rather, we live in a society which expresses a deep discomfort with
individuals who express characteristics and emotions not in con-
formity with their biological sex. Feminist theory reminds us that
this discomfort is more generally linked to sex-role oppression and
correlating patriarchal forms of privilege which is biologically
assigned.
In addition, the binary assumption of only two true sexes, and
thus two true genders, places not only transsexuals, but any indi-
vidual who expresses themselves in a way which is incongruent
with their biology, in a dangerous position. For the transsexual in
transition, the risks are evident: the expression of gender identity
and gender appearance (which is a prerequisite for surgery and
medically required through the real life test) is not correspondingly
met with the legal protection necessary to make such a real life
test possible. Until courts are willing to offer the special protection
needed to afford transsexuals an opportunity to reclaim their
"sex," such a disharmony between the medical community and the
legal community cannot be logically resolved.
Such a disharmony is not limited to the world of transsexuals,
but effects the larger social problem of an increased reliance on
biological determinism that will forever limit non-traditional men
and women. By challenging the legal community to re-examine
their biological reliance, by demanding that courts recognize the
difference between sex and gender, and then faithfully examining
when courts have, perhaps unknowingly, used the term gender in
place of sex, we are only asking the law to be accountable to the
power of semantics. Language matters.
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